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1  | INTRODUC TION
In the aftermath of major crises such as terrorist attacks, large acci‐
dents and natural disasters, governments face a demand for answers 
and accountability (Boin, Stern, ’t Hart, & Sundelius, 2016; Hood, 
2002). What went wrong? Who should be held to account? Could 
the crisis or its worst consequences have been prevented? And how 
can we protect ourselves against similar events in the future? While 
governments can certainly learn from crisis, there is a consensus in 
the literature that drawing appropriate lessons from crisis events is 
hard (Boin et al., 2016; Dekker & Hansén, 2004). Various reasons 
have been identified: Crises offer few previous examples to draw 
from; the major consequences of crisis make trial and error learn‐
ing prohibitive; and the political and organizational dynamics of the 
post‐crisis phase may result in erroneous lessons learned (Boin & ’t 
Hart, 2003; Moynihan, 2008).
Less attention has been paid to the specific institutional channels 
through which government learns from crisis. Enquiry commissions 
set up after crises are a commonly used mechanism for assess‐
ing what went wrong and draw lessons to prevent similar crises. 
Enquiry commissions have been used to investigate major terror‐
ist attacks such as “9/11,” natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina, 
socio‐technological accidents like the Fukushima Nuclear accident 
and pandemics like the swine flu. Existing literature indicates that 
enquiry commissions are important venues for crisis accountability 
and learning (Boin et al., 2016; Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Broekema, 
2016). Yet, studies have so far focused mainly on the political dynam‐
ics surrounding the appointment of commissions and the reception 
of their advice (Boin et al., 2016). Research on crisis management 
has said less about enquiry commissions themselves and how they 
filter information and orient lesson‐drawing. This paper attempts to 
fill this gap by exploring the following question: How do the tensions 
inherent to the work of enquiry commissions condition the subsequent 
opportunities of government to learn from crisis?
The argument of the paper is that enquiry commissions face a set 
of generic tensions in their work that affect their analysis and recom‐
mendations and therefore condition the lessons government might 
draw from crisis. Drawing on classic insights from organizational and 
institutional theory, we identify four tensions. The first and over‐
arching tension concerns the function of enquiry commissions in 
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The literature on crisis learning has thus far paid little attention to the institutional 
channels through which governments draw lessons from crisis events. This paper ex‐
amines theoretically and empirically a key institutional site for crisis learning: enquiry 
commissions. The theoretical argument is illustrated by analysing the enquiry com‐
mission that examined the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway. The paper argues that 
the work of enquiry commissions exhibits tensions that condition the subsequent 
opportunities of government to learn from crisis. The paper shows how the lessons 
drawn by the commission investigating the attacks were shaped by the commission's 
dual function, by the dominant professional perspectives within the group, and by 
the specific models of decision‐making and assessment standards that the commis‐
sion adopted.
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relation to the broader environment it exists and operates in, which 
is both instrumental and symbolic. The three other tensions concern 
the relation between the commission and its field of study, that is, 
how commissions as institutions assess and interpret information 
about crisis events.
The theoretical argument is illustrated by analysing the inde‐
pendent enquiry commission that examined the terrorist attacks in 
Norway on 22 July 2011, one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in 
the Western world in the last decade. The scale of the crisis and the 
political and societal significance of the enquiry make this a suitable 
case for elucidating empirically how the generic tensions enquiry 
commissions face can come into play in practice. The empirical anal‐
ysis examines the appointment and composition of the commission 
and the reasoning and conclusion in its report.
The paper contributes to the literature on crisis management 
by highlighting how the institutions through which government 
processes crisis experiences are far from neutral mechanisms for 
learning; rather, they filter information in particular ways and orient 
lesson‐drawing in specific directions. We develop a novel framework 
for understanding enquiry commissions derived from the sociolog‐
ical literature on organizations and institutions. The set of tensions 
that we outline can be applied in the study of post‐crisis enquiry 
commissions more generally. The sociological institutional perspec‐
tive points towards dynamics that are not fully accounted for in 
existing work, which has focussed on cognitive, organizational and 
political factors as determinants of learning from crisis.
The argument also has practical implications: Awareness about 
the fundamental challenges facing enquiry work may help practi‐
tioners avoid some major pitfalls and reduce the risk of erroneous 
learning from crisis.
The paper proceeds as follows: We first survey the literature on 
learning from crisis and existing work on the role of enquiry com‐
missions in this process. We then develop a theoretical argument 
about four tensions faced by enquiry commissions. These tensions 
are elucidated empirically with the case of the 22 July Commission. 
We conclude by discussing broader implications for the question of 
how government learns from crisis.
2  | LE ARNING FROM CRISIS
In the aftermath of crisis, an important task for public authorities 
is to draw lessons from what happened in order to prevent similar 
events in future. Learning from crisis can be understood as “deter‐
mining the causes of a crisis, assessing the strengths and weaknesses 
of the responses to it and undertaking remedial action based on this 
understanding” (Boin et al., 2016: 15).
The type of learning we focus on is governmental lesson‐drawing: 
what lessons does government draw about the causes of crisis (what 
went wrong and why), the effects and adequacy of the response and 
the appropriate measures to prevent future crises? This excludes 
questions of subsequent policy implementation, policy change or re‐
form, which are sometimes subsumed under the concept of learning 
(Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Birkland, 1997). Moreover, we are inter‐
ested in how central governments learn from crisis rather than how 
single organizations, units or teams learn. Finally, we are interested 
in the lessons that are drawn after a crisis event, which can be distin‐
guished from learning in crisis, that is the experience‐based learning 
that takes place during a single crisis episode (Moynihan, 2009).
Why it is so hard for governments to learn from crisis has been at 
the centre of scholarly attention (Boin et al., 2016; Dekker & Hansén, 
2004; Moynihan, 2008). Existing research has identified a variety of 
constraining factors, including cognitive, political and organizational 
factors (Moynihan, 2008; Smith & Elliott, 2007). Since crises are 
characterized by low probability/high consequence events, history 
offers meagre samples of experience to draw from. Moreover, “the 
high consequentiality of crises makes trial and error learning prohib‐
itive” (Moynihan, 2008: 351). Few opportunities to develop relevant 
capacities, combined with the tendency of individuals and organiza‐
tions to reproduce well‐learned responses to new threats, often re‐
sult in inappropriate responses (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).
Political dynamics also come into play after a crisis. First, differ‐
ent stakeholders try to agree on what went wrong (and not), and 
who, if anyone, is to be held accountable for the detected failures. 
To reduce the likelihood of being subject to any “blame‐games” 
(Hood, 2002), stakeholders often put much effort into how the 
crisis response is framed (Brändström & Kuipers, 2003; Edelman, 
1977). Second, crises function as “focusing events” (Birkland, 1997; 
Kingdon, 1984) where policy‐makers may see the crisis as a window 
of opportunity to promote policy ideas they want to implement, re‐
gardless of whether it is in fact an adequate response to the causes 
of the crisis. These political dynamics, and organizations' struggle 
for survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), give rise to bargaining and po‐
tentially suboptimal decisions which may result in erroneous lesson‐
drawing (Boin & ’t Hart, 2003; Moynihan, 2008).
However, less attention has been paid to the specific institu‐
tional channels for learning, such as enquiry commissions, hearings 
or internal evaluations (but see Stark, 2018). Enquiry commissions—
understood here as temporary bodies set up by political authorities 
after a crisis to assess crisis preparedness and response—are one of 
the principal tools of governments for drawing lessons from crisis. 
It should be emphasized that we do not believe there is a one‐to‐
one relation between the conclusions and policy recommendations 
made by enquiry commissions and the actual crisis learning by gov‐
ernments. What we do assume is that governmental crisis learning 
can be conditioned by enquiry commissions, which resonates with 
observations made in the existing literature.
Boin and colleagues point to independent enquiry commissions 
as key venues for crisis accountability and learning, observing that 
“publicly investigating and rendering account of a crisis is an essen‐
tial but delicate act of moving from crisis to a new normalcy” (Boin 
et al., 2016: 19; see also Broekema, 2016). They discuss how public 
leaders deal with these bodies. Given that the conclusions of en‐
quiry commissions can be damning to incumbents, political leaders 
may seek to steer or neutralize such bodies. Governments may try 
to avoid appointing an enquiry commission in the first place, restrict 
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the terms of reference of the investigation or hand‐pick commis‐
sion chairs or members who are sympathetic to the government. 
Yet, these scholars mainly discuss enquiry commissions from the 
perspective of the government and not from the perspective of the 
commission itself.
Another line of research has studied crisis‐investigating commis‐
sions through the lens of sense‐making (Gephart, 1984). However, 
these studies have primarily focused on the events described rather 
than the reports enquiry commissions produce (Brown, 2004). 
Two exceptions are Brown (2004) and Boudes and Laroche (2009), 
which take the enquiry report as their unit of analysis. Brown (2004) 
presents illustrating examples of “ways in which the sense‐making 
efforts of enquiry teams are represented in text as authoritative” 
(Brown, 2004: 109). Boudes and Laroche show how post‐crisis re‐
ports select some events while ignoring others and cast actors and 
attribute responsibilities according to basic plots. They observe 
some tensions in the role of enquiry commissions, such as the issue 
of predictability (whether the commission construes the crisis as 
predictable) and whether blame is attributed to individual and/or 
organizational factors. However, they do not link their analysis to 
the issue of learning, but argue that this is an important avenue for 
further research (Boudes & Laroche, 2009).
To conclude, existing crisis management literature acknowledges 
that enquiry commissions can play a significant role for crisis account‐
ability and learning. However, the challenges confronting enquiry 
commissions as mechanisms for crisis‐induced learning by govern‐
ments have not been systematically addressed. We attempt to fill 
this gap by identifying a set of tensions present in crisis‐investigating 
commissions that may condition what government learns from crisis.
3  | ENQUIRY COMMISSIONS AND 
LE ARNING FROM CRISIS
Our theoretical starting point is the sociological literature on organi‐
zations and institutions. This literature centres on the institutional 
aspects of organizations: how organizations work is not only a func‐
tion of formal characteristics but also of informal features (e.g., val‐
ues and ideas) and organizations' relationship to their environment 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott & Davis, 
2007). We argue that enquiry commissions can be understood as 
institutions whose work is affected by specific institutional dynam‐
ics. From the perspective of sociological institutional theory, the 
overarching tension confronting enquiry commissions in relation to 
their environment is what function they serve. Moreover, sociologi‐
cal institutional theory points towards specific tensions concerning 
how commissions relate to their field of study, that is, how com‐
missions assess and interpret information about crisis events. We 
identify three tensions, which concern commissions' epistemic basis, 
their understanding of organizational decision‐making and their stand‐
ards of assessment. From the perspective of sociological theory on 
organizations and institutions, we believe these four tensions cap‐
ture the fundamental challenges confronting enquiry commissions 
as institutions for learning from crisis. As we argue in the following, 
how commissions handle these tensions can condition what lessons 
government draws from crisis events.
3.1 | Function: Instrumental versus symbolic
A first tension faced by enquiry commissions is their double func‐
tion. On the one hand, commissions may be set up based on a genu‐
ine need to understand the crisis events and account for what went 
wrong, so that similar events can be averted in the future. This can be 
referred to as the instrumental function of commissions. This is in line 
with a rational or instrumental perspective on organizations, which 
emphasizes the formal goals of organizations and how organizational 
structures are consciously designed to achieve these goals (Scott & 
Davis, 2007). Seen from this perspective, enquiry commissions are 
carefully designed instruments for achieving the official goal of ac‐
counting for the crisis and crisis response. Commissions are part of a 
rational learning process, where inquiries lead to policy changes that 
make government better prepared to address the next crisis.
Yet, enquiry commissions also have a symbolic function 
(Ashforth, 1990). In the wake of major crises, the need to reassure 
the population and ensure societal cohesion is strong. Appointing an 
enquiry commission can be a way to signal that the authorities take 
the event seriously and are committed to preventing similar events, 
to forge a common understanding of the crisis and to restore confi‐
dence in government (Parker & Dekker, 2008). It can also be a way 
to defuse or postpone the political conflicts raised by a crisis. The 
sheer fact of setting up an investigative commission may therefore 
be as important as the content of the investigation. This is in line 
with a symbolic or ceremonial perspective on organizations, which 
sees organizational structures as a reflection of expectations and 
norms in the environment. Organizations need to conform to these 
“myths” in order to be seen as legitimate, which leads them to adopt 
particular structures in a ceremonial way (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Enquiry commissions can thus be seen as 
a ceremonial answer to expectations about government action and 
accountability after crisis, aimed at ensuring the legitimacy of the 
political order.
These two functions may be compatible. Commissions that lack 
relevant competences or the independence to carry out a proper en‐
quiry will likely have limited symbolic value. And the symbolic impor‐
tance of enquiry commissions may entail generous resources (e.g., 
funding, access to evidence) that strengthen their ability to carry out 
their instrumental function (see Parker & Dekker, 2008). Yet, there 
are also tensions between the two functions, which may affect the 
ability of government to learn from crisis. First, the symbolic quali‐
ties required to lead or be part of an enquiry commission may not 
be the same as the qualities required to analyse the crisis response. 
Second, the importance of forging a common understanding of the 
crisis may stand in the way of divisive but more accurate conclusions. 
Third, the fact of proposing reforms to prevent similar events in the 
future may be more important than whether these are actually ap‐
propriate policy changes to improve crisis preparedness.
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3.2 | Epistemic basis: Competing professional and 
disciplinary perspectives
A second tension facing enquiry commissions relates to the expert 
knowledge used to analyse crisis events. The growing complexity 
and uncertainty of modern society has made advanced specialized 
knowledge indispensable for analysing societal issues (Haas, 1992). 
At the same time, crises have become increasingly “transboundary” 
in nature (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010). Examples are complex terror‐
ist attacks like “9/11” or large‐scale natural disasters like the 2004 
tsunami in South‐East Asia. The transboundary character of crises 
not only means that problems cut across policy areas and agency 
boundaries; it also implies that problems span different professional 
and disciplinary fields. For instance, modern Islamic terrorism has 
political, social, religious and technological aspects. Analysing this 
phenomenon thus involves experts from fields such as religious 
studies, political science, criminology, policing, intelligence and IT.
Different professions and disciplines rely on distinct perspec‐
tives and models for understanding the social world. These perspec‐
tives highlight certain aspects of a problem and focus the attention 
on specific actor motivations. An example is the focus in economic 
models on self‐interested behaviour and the incentive structures 
faced by actors (Schlefer, 2012). Yet, this also means that profes‐
sional and disciplinary perspectives have “blind spots”: by focusing 
on one aspect of a problem complex, other aspects are neglected. 
The implication is that the type of expert knowledge employed by an 
enquiry commission shapes its analysis of the crisis. The professional 
and disciplinary composition of a commission and the kind of analyti‐
cal capacities at its disposal not only influence how the causes of cri‐
sis and determinants of the crisis response are understood, but also 
what are seen as appropriate remedies. By shaping the commission's 
interpretation of the crisis, the epistemic basis of the commission 
can influence what lessons government draws from the crisis.
3.3 | Models of decision‐making in organizations
Another tension faced by enquiry commissions concerns how they 
understand organizational decision‐making. Decisions taken by indi‐
viduals operating within organizational settings are at the centre of 
any crisis, both in preventing crises and in mitigating their impact. 
Examples are the decisions of agency directors on what resources 
to deploy to avert a crisis, or the decisions of front‐line police of‐
ficers during a crisis situation. Analysing and explaining such pro‐
cesses involve choosing analytical perspectives, explanatory models 
and theoretical frameworks. These choices may be linked to the kind 
of professional and disciplinary perspectives that dominate within a 
commission (see previous section).
First, how enquiry commissions perceive rationality has implica‐
tions for what issues are regarded as salient. If one regards decision‐
makers primarily as calculating and utility‐maximizing individuals, 
this implies a focus on preferences, cognitive capacity and informa‐
tion processing, and on how these influence individual and organi‐
zational decision‐making (March & Simon, 1993). By contrast, if one 
perceives decision‐makers primarily as rule‐following members of a 
collective, this implies a focus on identity, roles and social positions, 
and on how these influence and frame people's interpretation of 
the situation they are in (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; March & Olsen, 
1989).
Second, enquiry commissions are bound to focus more on some 
organizational and institutional factors than others, and on partic‐
ular analytical levels. For instance, do they give primacy to formal 
structures like organizational charts, the hierarchical division of 
position and rank and standard operating procedures or rather to 
informal structures like norms, custom and organizational cultures? 
Moreover, do they focus on the individuals within the organization 
or on macro‐level factors such as how the organization is influenced 
by broader norms in its environment?
Third, how enquiry commissions balance individual‐ and sys‐
tem‐oriented explanations is likely to affect their diagnosis and pre‐
scription. Some scholars argue that accidents are inevitable because 
organizations grow increasingly dependent on technologies charac‐
terized by interactive complexity and tight coupling (Perrow, 1999). 
Commissions adhering to this view are likely to focus on detecting 
technical errors and malfunctioning systems, while commissions 
adhering to perspectives emphasizing the role of management and 
leadership (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2011) are likely to focus on whose 
individual actions were wrong/inadequate and whose were right/
adequate. Thus, the perspectives, models and frameworks implicitly 
or explicitly adopted by the commission have implications for which 
lessons are drawn from the crisis.
3.4 | Assessment standards
A fourth tension faced by enquiry commissions relates to the as‐
sessment of the adequacy of crisis preparedness and response. 
Evaluating whether relevant authorities were sufficiently prepared 
for the crisis and whether their response was adequate often lies 
at the centre of inquiries. The former involves evaluating whether 
plans and procedures were appropriate, whether actors had the 
necessary resources to prevent the crisis, and whether they had 
sufficient competence to detect and prevent the crisis. The latter 
involves examining whether plans and procedures were followed, 
and whether the actors had adequate resources and competences 
to respond to the crisis.
However, these assessments depend fundamentally on how 
the enquiry commission judges the nature of the incident itself, 
that is, its predictability (Boudes & Laroche, 2009)—whether the 
incidents are deemed imaginable or lie beyond what one could ex‐
pect, so‐called “unknown unknowns.” If a crisis is impossible to 
imagine, there are no real grounds for criticizing actors for not hav‐
ing included such a scenario in their contingency plans or prepared 
for such an incident. Neglecting the nature of the crisis therefore 
increases the risk of judging crisis preparedness according to unre‐
alistic standards and of drawing the wrong lessons from the crisis.
Moreover, the assessment of how actors responded to a crisis 
will depend on what information the actors had at the time of the 
     |  5RENÅ aNd CHRISTENSEN
incident. Looking back at crises, we have a tendency to judge the 
actions based on retrospective reasoning (Vaughan, 1999), also 
known as hindsight bias. Failing to take into account what actors 
knew at the time may lead commissions to draw erroneous con‐
clusions about the actions taken in response to crisis, which sub‐
sequently may lead to erroneous “lessons learned.” What weight 
to attribute to the effects of actions constitutes an additional chal‐
lenge. If enquiry commissions do not consider the positive or neg‐
ative effects of actions in their assessments, this could jeopardize 
the legitimacy of the commission with the general public. Yet, if 
commissions base their assessments solely on what effects the 
actions had, they run the risk of drawing conclusions that disre‐
gard the extremeness of the crisis situation. Importantly, the stan‐
dards of assessment chosen by a commission may be linked to its 
understanding of decision‐making in organizations (see previous 
section).
Finally, the four tensions may also interact in shaping what les‐
sons are drawn from crisis. Most notably, the symbolic function of 
enquiry commissions may heighten the risk of drawing erroneous 
lessons from crisis due to blind spots in disciplinary understandings, 
misjudging the predictability of the crisis, or hindsight bias. The com‐
bination of the symbolic pressure to propose reforms to prevent fu‐
ture crises and the considerable risks of misjudging the causes or 
preventability of crises increases the chance that government will 
base policy on faulty lessons.
4  | RESE ARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
We elucidate our theoretical argument with an analysis of how the 
four tensions played out in the case of the 22 July Commission, an 
independent commission set up by the Norwegian government to 
investigate the terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011. The case study 
functions as an instrument to illustrate how the four tensions 
manifest themselves empirically (cf. Thomas, 2011). We analyse 
qualitatively the terms of reference of the commission, its com‐
position (including biographical data on its members), the report 
itself (i.e., the reasoning and conclusions contained in the report) 
and political statements about the commission. We also draw on 
existing research commentary about the commission. The analy‐
sis is based on publically available sources and can be verified by 
other researchers.
The authors of this article do not have personal connections to 
the empirical subject matter. However, we are both scholars from 
the field of political science and public administration, which neces‐
sarily shapes our perspective on the crisis and the commission.
5  | THE 22 JULY COMMISSION
On 22 July 2011, Norway experienced the most serious terrorist at‐
tacks in modern history. The right‐wing extremist Anders Behring 
Breivik first detonated a bomb inside the government complex in 
Oslo and two hours later carried out a shooting massacre at a Labour 
Party youth camp on the island of Utøya. A total of 77 people were 
killed in the attacks.
The Labour‐led government—in consultation with the opposi‐
tion—quickly appointed an enquiry commission to investigate the 
attacks. In Norway, there is a long tradition of relying on tempo‐
rary commissions to examine major policy issues and crisis events 
(Christensen & Holst, 2017). The 22 July Commission was given 
this official status. Its terms of reference stated that the aim was to 
“carry out a review and evaluation to draw lessons from the events, 
with the goal of making Norwegian society as well prepared as pos‐
sible to prevent and respond to possible attacks in the future” (NOU, 
2012, p. 38). In other words, learning from the crisis was a central 
and explicit objective of the commission. The terms of reference also 
explicitly stated that the commission was independent from Cabinet 
and the Prime Minister's Office. The commission was given exten‐
sive resources and access to involved actors and documentation. 
The entire report from the commission was made public, as is the 
tradition with official enquiry reports in Norway.
5.1 | Function
The tension between an instrumental and a symbolic function was 
evident in the appointment of the 22 July Commission. After the 
most serious act of violence in modern Norwegian history, there was 
a pressing need to understand what had caused and permitted such 
an attack (Holst, 2016). The commission was in part designed to fulfil 
this instrumental function: it was asked to provide a factual account 
of events, to assess the preparations and response of government 
and to propose measures to improve the preparedness for crisis. It 
was also given the resources, access and independence to carry out 
a thorough investigation (NOU, 2012).
Yet, the commission also had a highly symbolic role. Few had an‐
ticipated a major terrorist attack on Norwegian soil, and the violence 
and political motivation of the attacks had rocked Norwegian soci‐
ety. Re‐establishing a feeling of security among the population and 
ensuring political and societal cohesion was paramount. Moreover, 
the perception of a flawed government response generated expec‐
tations about government action and accountability (Christensen, 
Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2013). This symbolic aspect was apparent in the 
statements from political leaders. Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg 
asked the commission to deliver an “honest and unembellished” 
account of events that could generate “a shared understanding” of 
what happened, and later commended the commission for creating 
“a shared narrative” of what went wrong (Lode, 2011).
What may be seen as one expression of this symbolic role was 
the government's emphasis on setting up a commission without par‐
ticipation from the public authorities, which are usually represented 
in Norwegian official commissions (Christensen & Holst, 2017). One 
could object that relying solely on outside expertise was necessary 
for the commission to perform its instrumental function, by ensuring 
independence from the interests of cabinet or government agencies. 
However, it also deprived the commission of valuable administrative 
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knowledge about how the main government institutions in the area 
of security and justice worked. This may be seen as something that 
weakened its ability to draw relevant conclusions from the crisis.
The 22 July Commission's proposals for reform may also be seen 
as a reflection of its symbolic role. Asked to propose measures to 
enhance crisis preparedness, the commission recommended a set 
of changes centred on strengthening culture and leadership in the 
government bureaucracy. Its main recommendation was that “man‐
agers at all levels of the public administration systematically work to 
strengthen their own and their organizations' fundamental attitudes 
and culture related to the recognition of risk, the ability to execute 
decisions, coordination, the use of ICT and result‐oriented leader‐
ship” (NOU, 2012: 458). The problem with this recommendation was 
twofold. First, it lacked a solid empirical basis. The commission un‐
covered a series of flaws in the government's preparation for and 
response to the attacks, but presented scant evidence that these 
flaws were actually related to administrative culture and leadership 
rather than to other factors (cf. Høyer, Madsbu, & Tranøy, 2018). 
In other words, there was a disconnection between the analysis of 
events and the reform proposals. Second, the recommendation was 
rather vague. The idea of improving culture and leadership in public 
organizations was certainly appealing and difficult to disagree with. 
Yet, what kind of concrete changes were necessary and how one 
might assess progress along these dimensions was difficult to grasp.
5.2 | Epistemic basis
Like other commissions investigating complex crisis events, the 22 
July Commission relied heavily on expert knowledge. Not only were 
most commission and secretariat members highly educated profes‐
sionals or academics; the commission also commissioned analyses 
and expert assessments and met with academics (NOU, 2012). Yet, 
certain types of expert knowledge were more important than others. 
Most striking was the dominance of legal expertise. The commission 
leader was a lawyer with both Norwegian and international degrees, 
and nearly half of the members of the commission and its secretariat 
had a legal background. Legal expertise partly overlapped with a po‐
lice background: Three of the ten commission members (including 
the two foreign members) came from the police. Moreover, central 
commission and secretariat members had experience from the cor‐
porate world.
Other disciplines were also present, including history and po‐
litical science. Yet, some relevant specific types of expertise were 
missing. Given the commission's task of assessing crisis management 
in public organizations, the absence of public administration or orga‐
nizational scholars on the commission was notable. The two political 
scientists in the commission and the secretariat had worked on inter‐
national terrorism and the EU, respectively. Although the commis‐
sion possessed extensive knowledge about specific organizations, 
such as the police, it had limited expertise on the organization of the 
public sector more generally. The commissioned expert analyses did 
not address the administrative and organizational aspects of crisis 
management to any significant degree either.
The professional and disciplinary composition of the commission 
appears to have shaped its analysis and conclusions (Christensen, 
2013). A legal approach was recognizable in the commission's as‐
sessment of how different agencies dealt with crisis. It put great 
emphasis on formal responsibilities, rules and plans and assessed 
organizational performance against the formally adopted standards 
for security and crisis preparedness (NOU, 2012). The business 
perspective may be recognized in the commission's strong belief in 
leadership: The failures of public organizations prior to and during 
the attacks were frequently ascribed to a lack of leadership. The 
view underlying much of the commission's analysis was that leaders 
have great influence on how organizations work, with the ability to 
change the basic attitudes and culture within the organization. At 
the same time, the commission neglected other potential organiza‐
tional dynamics underlying the crisis response of public agencies, for 
instance related to organizational structures or standard operating 
procedures (discussed further below; Christensen, 2013; Fimreite, 
Lango, Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2014). This might be seen as a reflection 
of its lack of expertise from public administration or organizational 
science. The professional profile of the commission thus appears to 
have led it to highlight certain aspects of the failed response to the 
terrorist attacks while overlooking others.
5.3 | Models of decision‐making in organizations
Large parts of the 22 July Commission's report concerned deci‐
sion‐making within organizations, from the administrative decisions 
about security at the government complex to the operational deci‐
sions of police officers during the terrorist attacks. In its conclusions, 
the commission expressed its basic understanding of what factors 
influenced organizational decision‐making:
“We have seen few examples of formal organization 
being a constraining factor.’ […] [W]hat fundamentally 
distinguished what went well from what went wrong 
on July 22 was primarily related to attitudes, culture 
and leadership, and how people and organizations ex‐
ecuted the authority they were delegated”. ( NOU 
2012: 456, 458, original emphasis)
Yet, this conclusion was challenged by much of the evidence 
presented in the report, which suggested that formal organizational 
structures had indeed played an important role. Fimreite et al. (2014) 
criticized the commission for employing a too narrow perspective on 
organizations, not recognizing that the problems related to culture, 
leadership and execution cannot be understood independently of 
formal organization. For instance, the commission did not link the ob‐
served problem of coordination across ministries to the highly special‐
ized structure of the Norwegian government bureaucracy.
Another blind spot in the commission's view of organizations 
concerned routines and standard operating procedures. Much of the 
organizational behaviour described in the report—for example the 
failure to implement security measures at the government complex 
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or the confused police response to the attacks – could plausibly be 
explained with reference to the routines adopted by organizations 
(Christensen, 2013). Yet, the commission insisted on attributing this 
behaviour to flaws in organizational culture or leadership, which 
may be seen as a reflection of its understanding of organizational 
decision‐making.
In the conclusion of the report, the commission also addressed 
the tension between individual‐ and system‐oriented explanations: 
“In the search for scapegoats, it is easy to forget that malfunctioning 
systems can put individuals in situations where they are exposed to 
making fatal mistakes” (NOU, 2012: 457). However, in its analyses 
of errors in the crisis preparedness and response, it was not always 
clear what, if anything, was to be blamed: human error or a malfunc‐
tioning system? For example, when analysing the police operation at 
Utøya, the commission pointed to “severe flaws in management and 
coordination” (p. 121) and “severe weaknesses (…) in the execution 
of their operation” (p. 146). Yet, when summing up, it highlighted two 
factors as particularly important: low staffing at the operations cen‐
tre and the lack of well‐functioning communication systems. Both 
factors point to systemic problems, not individuals. This way of rea‐
soning left a blurred image of whether certain individuals involved in 
the crisis response could be held accountable.
In sum, the commission pointed in its conclusions to some spe‐
cific organizational factors (culture, leadership, attitudes) that had 
to be changed in order to improve governmental decision‐making in 
crisis response. However, as shown, the empirical findings in the re‐
port could also be seen as indicating a need for changes in the formal 
structures of organizing. Thus, if its analysis had been grounded in 
other models of decision‐making, the commission might have come 
to different conclusions and consequently emphasized other organi‐
zational factors in need of reform.
5.4 | Assessment standards
In its report, the commission provided some introductory reflections 
on the task of assessing a crisis event. Because crises are charac‐
terized by unpredictability, existing plans and experience can never 
fully cover a situation, it argued. The main challenge is to avoid that 
its “vision is too coloured by the knowledge of the actual end re‐
sult” (NOU, 2012: 14), that is, to avoid hindsight bias. The solution 
is “to reconstruct both the situation and available information as it 
appeared to the respective actors” (p. 14).
The awareness of the risk of hindsight bias was less visible in 
the analysis. For example, the police was criticized for not making 
greater efforts in the initial phase of the Utøya operation to retrieve 
more boats. In hindsight, the access to boats was a decisive point, 
given that the police overloaded their own boat on their way to the 
island, which caused the engine to stall and delayed them at least 
ten minutes. However, no one knew initially that the police boat at 
a later point would stall. Moreover, the police operation commander 
assumed that the local fire department was on its way with its own 
boat, because she had ordered her subordinate to mobilize this re‐
source. However, this operation was delayed due to a technical error. 
Thus, the need for more boats was not evident for those involved in 
the operation in the early stages (Renå, 2019).
In a similar vein, the commission's assessment of rule‐following 
behaviour versus improvization appears to be coloured by the effects 
of the actions taken. For example, only minutes after the explosion 
in Oslo, one assistant operating the switchboard received detailed 
information about (what we in hindsight know was) the getaway car. 
She deviated from standard procedure, which would have been to 
distribute it to the operation centre by registering the information 
in their computerized log system. Instead, she wrote the information 
on a piece of paper and brought it to the operation control centre. 
The commission's assessment of the operator assistant's response 
was that she “showed impressive initiative and execution of tasks” 
(NOU, 2012: 108). Yet, it seems unlikely that the commission's as‐
sessment would have been the same if the car had not turned out to 
be the getaway car (see Renå, 2019).
In other words, the commission's assessment of crisis response 
was in part characterized by hindsight bias and assessing decisions 
based on their effects. This appears to have shaped the commis‐
sion's assessments of performance and policy recommendations, 
leading it to portray the attacks as more manageable and prevent‐
able than was the case.
6  | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Why is it so hard for government to learn from crisis? Whereas exist‐
ing accounts highlight the particular nature of crisis and various cog‐
nitive, political and organizational constraints, this paper has looked 
more closely at the specific institutions involved in governmental 
learning from crisis. We have focused on one particular institutional 
mechanism: enquiry commissions.
Building on sociological theory on organizations and institutions, 
we have argued that these bodies face a set of tensions that makes 
lesson‐drawing anything but a straightforward exercise. We con‐
clude that the work of enquiry commissions exhibits tensions that 
condition the subsequent opportunities of government to learn from 
crisis. Not only do these institutions have multiple functions, they 
are also faced with competing professional perspectives, models of 
decision‐making and assessment standards when examining a crisis. 
The discussion of the 22 July Commission has provided an illustra‐
tion of how these challenges manifest themselves in the work of 
enquiry commissions and how they may condition the subsequent 
opportunities for government to learn from crisis. Exactly how this 
happens in each particular case is primarily an empirical question.
It must however be stressed that enquiry commissions are only 
one institutional mechanism through which lesson‐drawing from cri‐
ses occurs. Other institutional mechanisms include hearings (public, 
parliamentary, ad hoc), internal evaluations and courts. What institu‐
tional mechanisms exist varies between countries due to differences 
in their political system.
There are of course important limits to the argument and anal‐
ysis presented in this paper. First, it must be emphasized that our 
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empirical case merely serves to illustrate the mechanisms of the the‐
oretical argument; it does not allow us to test the argument. The role 
of enquiry commissions is likely to depend on what type of politi‐
cal‐administrative system they operate in. The 22 July Commission 
operated in a particular political‐administrative and societal context, 
and enquiry commissions in other settings may work in significantly 
different ways. More systematic empirical research is therefore 
needed to assess the scope of our argument.
Second, from the perspective of sociological theory on orga‐
nizations and institutions, we have identified and discussed four 
tensions that we see as crucial for understanding the capacity of 
governments to learn through enquiry commissions. Yet, other 
theoretical perspectives would direct the attention to other signifi‐
cant tensions. For instance, a political science/public administration 
perspective would highlight the tension between independence 
and political control (Lindberg, 2013). Our discussion assumes that 
commissions enjoy a considerable degree of independence in their 
work. However, where the work and conclusions of commissions 
are dictated or strongly influenced by politicians, this will obviously 
affect the opportunities for learning. If truth‐seeking takes a back‐
seat to specific political agendas, this undercuts the whole idea of 
learning from crisis (Rosenthal, ’t Hart, & Kouzmin, 1991). Related to 
this, the role of the enquiry commission also hinges on its relation 
to other accountability forums (Fleischer, 2017). Moreover, enquiry 
commissions are likely not unaffected by the broader public post‐cri‐
sis discourse. For example, a public outcry concerning parts of the 
crisis response by the public authorities could affect to what extent 
enquiry commissions play an instrumental or symbolic function.
Finally, it is worth discussing the more practical implications of 
our argument. How can enquiry commissions be effective tools for 
governmental learning from crisis? Can the tensions facing enquiry 
commissions be mitigated, and if so, how and by whom? To some 
extent, these tensions reflect real trade‐offs between important 
concerns (see also George, 1980; Stern, 2015). A commission may 
successfully perform its symbolic role but provide few appropriate 
recommendations for reform. Conversely, a commission that ex‐
clusively focuses on its instrumental function and ignores its sym‐
bolic role may provide a rock‐solid analysis but have little political 
impact.
Yet, there are also ways to mitigate these tensions. One strategy 
is to ensure epistemic diversity within enquiry commissions, which 
can be done by the responsible governmental body setting up the 
commission. By ensuring that different types of relevant expertise 
are represented, bias can be avoided (Holst & Molander, 2017). 
Another strategy is transparency about assessment standards (cf. 
Stern, 2015), which can be ensured by the commission itself or the 
governmental body that sets it up, for example in the terms of ref‐
erence. An explicit statement of the assessment standards for crisis 
preparedness and response can ensure consistent assessment and 
make it easier to evaluate the commission's conclusions. The poten‐
tial for governmental learning can also be increased through more 
critical consideration of the correspondence between analysis and 
recommendations. Too often, proposals for change in reports by 
enquiry commissions are only loosely coupled to the evidence on the 
crisis response. Making sure that the “what should be done?” follows 
logically from the “what went wrong?” is crucial for learning. Finally, 
effective learning depends on balancing the experiences from the 
most recent crisis against existing knowledge and experiences. If 
not, the lessons learned from the last crisis may easily become the 
sources of the next.
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ENDNOTE S
1 We adhere to a broad definition of institutions, which includes “not just 
formal rules, procedures or norms, but the symbol systems, cognitive 
scripts and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guid‐
ing human action” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 947). 
2 We are indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for this point. 
3 A bomb explosion in the government complex akin to the first of the 
two terrorist attacks was among the scenarios in the government's 
“Security Project” initiated in 2002. However, the project was highly 
classified and few were thus informed. More generally, few, if any, 
had anticipated a scenario with two terrorist attacks akin to 22/7, 
and right‐wing terrorism was not considered a significant threat by 
the authorities. 
4 All quotes from Norwegian sources are translated by the authors. 
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